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A Rejoinder to Dunnette and Campbell

1. I agree that the goal of research is to obtain information that is free from ambiguity. My position, supported by nearly a dozen scientists, is that research activities have built-in unintended consequences that *increase* ambiguity. To identify many research methods as mechanistic and hostility-inducing is not to demean science; it is to face reality and save science. I have heard Dunnette advise executives that behavioral scientists are not anti-organization when they identify its negative impact on individuals. Dunnette and Campbell may wish to follow this advice when their "god" is found wanting.

2. The Rubin study is significantly different from Dunnette's in that Rubin studied an actual field situation and designed his research so that it could be a learning experience for the subjects.

3. Dunnette and Campbell claim that many experimentalists are not interpersonally incompetent because they know some who seem to function well. It is ironic that when they defend their position, they use the same kind of anecdotal evidence that they condemn T-group practitioners for using.

4. I am not unwilling to subject the possibility of transfer effects to systematic study. As Dunnette knows very well, I have published two, and have directed two other, such studies.

May I close with some advice to all of us, ". . . we have to discriminate between the weight to be given to scientific opinion in the selection of its methods, and its trustworthiness in formulating judgments of the understanding. The slightest scrutiny of the history of natural science shows that current scientific opinion is nearly infallible in the former case, and is invariably wrong in the latter case. The man with a method good for purposes of his dominant interests, is a pathological case in respect to his wider judgment on the coordination of this method with a more complete experience."[1]

[1] A. N. Whitehead, *The Function of Reason* (New York: Beacon, 1929), p. 11.